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This thesis looks at optimally allocating communication resources
from a game theory point of view. Three basic models are presented
and then expanded upon. A prime objective is to briefly review repre-
sentative examples of work previously done in the attack-defense area
showing how it can be applied to the optimal allocation problem for com-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Communication systems represent an integral part of progress in
the social, business, and technical fields. Certainly this statement
needs no qualification when applied to the military. With the increase
in destructive power and improvement of accuracy in modern weapons,
large-scale dispersion of troops on the battlefield has become part of
the doctrine of warfare. Wider separation has imposed difficulty in
controlling and directing forces at all levels of command from squad
leader to force commander. Rapid, secure and reliable communication
is indispensable in marshalling resources to obtain the military and
political objective. Indeed, quality and quantity of communication
systems often provides the margin of victory.
Military communication systems encompass a wide range of
sophistication; the spectrum runs from the hand-held, short range,
single channel radio to the most modern orbiting satellite system.
By far the most important in terms of volume of traffic and ease of
control is the multi- channel, wide band radio system in the Marine
Division. This system closely parallels the long-haul, inter-city
trunking system operated nationally by the Bell System and independ-
ent telephone companies. Both of these systems have a network of
radio links interconnecting nodal or terminal points.

It, then, is a recognized fact in the military that effective com-
munication is an essential element for success of a command. The
military spends vast sums of money annually in an effort to procure
the equipment, personnel, and other resources needed by a commander
to establish effective communications. Without effective communications
it would be difficult for a military unit to survive in today's combat
environment. However, even considering the importance of commu-
nications, the majority of officers who work in the field of commu-
nication often rely on past experience and knowledge of the situation as
a basis for their recommendations and decisions affecting the allocation
of communication resources. Of course, these Communication Officers
back up their experience with reconnaissance and area research. A
brief examination of past history shows that this method of deciding
upon the quantity of resources to be allocated has many times been
most successful. However, it would seem possible that some purely
analytical, and somewhat less subjective, techniques could be applied
to the problem of optimally allocating communication resources. One
suggested approach is game theory.
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine possible applications of
certain game theory models to the problem of optimally allocating
communication equipment. It is not feasible in this thesis to cover all
possible applications of Game Theory to problems of resource alloca-
tion, rather it is hoped that a broad overview of such applications can
be presented so as to act as a basis for future work in this area.

It is assumed that readers have a background in mathematics and
hopefully are acquainted with Game Theory. As an aid to those readers
who are not familiar with Game Theory, a brief introduction to the
theory of games is given in the following section. Some of the more
important definitions and concepts are summarized. For a more detail
discussion the reader should consult the references listed in the bib-
liography (for example, see [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [11], [14], [15]).

II. GAMES OF STRATEGY
The theory of games of strategy is a mathematical theory of
competitive decision-making. Games of strategy and games of pure
chance differ in that only in the former can the participant bring any
influence to bear on the outcome of an event. As a result, intelligence
and skill can be useful in the play of games of strategy. Examples of
parlor games of strategy are such games as chess, bridge, and poker,
•where the various players can make use of their ingenuity in order to
outwit each other. The theory of games is, in general, applicable to
situations which involve conflicting interests, and in which the outcome
is controlled partly by one side and partly by the opposing side of the
conflict [11].
Note that several of the examples of games of strategy given above
involve the element of chance, but, none the less, in each case the
participants in these games are allowed, under the rules of the game,
to make certain decisions which are completely independent of chance.
Games which depend completely on chance and which do not allow the
participants an opportunity to exercise any influence, such as dice,
are not considered in the Theory of Games of Strategy.
It should be mentioned, finally, that the theory of games of strat-
egy can be expected to find practical application in all kinds of situations
in which various people have opposing goals and in which each of them,

although he may exert some influence on the outcome, cannot com-
pletely dominate the course of events [11].
Now to Game Theory itself.
RULES AND PLAYERS
First of all, a game of strategy is described by its set of rules.
The rules specify what each participant, called a player is allowed, or
required, to do under all possible circumstances. Further, rules
determine the amount of information, if any, each player receives.
If the game involves the use of chance devices, or if chance occur-
rences are an integral part of the situation establishing the game, the
rules specify how the chance events shall be interpreted. Finally, the
rules define when the game ends, the amount each player pays or
receives, and the objective of each player. As applied to poker, the
rules govern how the cards are to be doled out, who may bet and when,
how the various hands are to be judged in the showdown, and what
happens to the pot.
NUMBER OF PLAYERS
One of the fundamental distinctions in Game Theory is the number
of players - distinct sets of interest - that are present in the game.
The form of analysis and the entire character of the situation depend
on this number. There are three values, for the number of players,
which have special significance: one, two, and more-than-two
(n, where n = 3, 4, 5 . . . ).

Solitaire is an example of a one-person game when played for
recreation, for your interests are the only ones present. One-person
games are uninteresting, from the Game Theory point of view, and
therefore are not really looked at here. In one-person games you
simply select the course of action that yields the most and do it. If
there are chance elements, you usually select the action which yields
the most on the average, and do it. However, one person games
(including Solitaire) may be regarded as a special kind of two-person
game in which you are one of the players and Nature is the other.
The true two-person game is very interesting. It occurs fre-
quently and its solution is often within our present means, both con-
ceptual and technological. This is the common conflict situation. You
have an opponent who, you must assume, is intelligent and trying to
undo you. If you choose a course of action which appears favorable,
he may discover your plans and set a trap which capitalizes on the
particular choice you have made. Many situations which are not
strictly two-person games may be treated as if they were; a five man
Poker game is an example of this, where you could assign the interests
present at the table to two "persons", yourself and everybody-not-you.
Most of the work done in Game Theory deals with the two-person game.
THE PAYOFF
It has been indicated that the number of persons /players involved
is one of the important items for classifying and studying games,
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"person" meaning a distinct set of interests. Another criterion has
to do with the payoff: What happens at the end of the game? Say at
the end of a hand in Poker? Well, in Poker there is usually just an
exchange of assets. If there are two persons, say (Blue) and (Red),
then if Blue should win $10, Red would lose $10. In other words,
Blue winnings = Red losses
or, stated otherwise,
Blue winnings , - Red losses =
We may also write it as
Blue payoff + Red payoff = $10+(-$l0) =
by adopting the convention that winnings are positive numbers and that
losers are negative numbers. The sum of the payoff need not be zero.
For instance, if the person who wins the pot has to contribute 10 per
cent toward the drinks and other incidentals, then the sum of the
payoffs is not zero; in fact
Blue payoff - Red payoff = $9 - $10 = -$1
The above two cases illustrate a fundamental distinction among
games: It is important to know whether or not the sum of the payoffs,
counting winnings as positive and losses as negative, to all players is
zero. If it is, the game is known as a Zero-Sum game. If it is not,
the game is known as a Non- Zero-Sum game.
STRATEGIES
Just as the word person or player has a meaning in Game Theory
somewhat different from everyday usage, the word strategy does too.
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This word, as used in its everyday sense, carries the connotation
of a particularly skillful or adroit plan, whereas in Game Theory it
designates any complete plan. A strategy is a plan so complete that
it cannot be upset by enemy action or Nature; for everything that the
enemy or nature may choose to do, together with a set of possible
actions for yourself, is just part of the description of the strategy.
So the strategy of Game Theory differs in two important respects
from the conventional meaning: It must be utterly complete and it may
be utterly bad; for nothing is required of it except completeness. Thus,
in Poker, all strategies must make provision for your being dealt a
Royal Flush in Spades, and some of them will require that you fold
instantly. Note that a player's plan of action, his strategy, is com-
plete and ready to use before the commencement of the game.
A strategy which guarantees a player the best he can expect
regardless of what the other players do is called an optimal strategy .
FINITENESS
There are critical values in the number of strategies; and it turns
out to be important to distinguish two major categories. In the first
are games in which the player having the greatest number of strat-
egies still has a finite number. The second major category is that in
which at least one player has infinitely many strategies.
12

A PLAY OF THE GAME
The expression "a play of the game" has been used several times
in this thesis. However, the exact nature of a play of the game may
or may not be apparent. In the Theory of Games the choosing of a
particular strategy by each player, along with the exchange of payoffs
which possibly result, is defined as a play of the game.
VALUE OF THE GAME
The value of the game is the expected payoff transferred between
the players when each player employs his optimal strategy.
Usually the opposing players are placed into one of two categories,
either maximizing or minimizing. In an unfair game, a game in which
the value is some number greater than zero, the maximizing player,
or group of players, will realize a positive expectation. Therefore,
the maximizing player will select an optimal strategy so as to max-
imize his winnings. On the oter hand in an unfair game the minimiz-
ing player, or groups of players, will expect to lose the value of the
game. Therefore, the minimizing player will choose an optimal
strategy so as to minimize his losses. Of course if the value of the
game is negative, then the maximizing player will have negative
expected winnings and the minimizing player will have negative
expected losses. In this case the maximizing player will continue to
select strategies which will maximize his expected winnings. But
since his expected winnings are negative, in this case, he is in effect
13

minimizing his losses. Likewise, the minimizing player will continue
to choose strategies which will minimize his expected losses. But
since his expected losses are negative he is actually maximizing his
winnings. In either case, and also in the case of a fair game, one in
which the value of the game is zero, all players select strategies
which will maximize their individual utilities.
THE GAME MATRIX
Now it is possible to complete the description of games, i. e.
,
conflict situations, in the form required for Game Theory analysis.
Remarks will primarily apply to finite, zero-sum, two-person games.
The players are Blue and Red. Each has several potential strat-
egies, which we assume are known; let them be numbered just for
identification. Blue's strategies will then bear names, such as Blue 1,
Blue 2, and so on; perhaps in a specific case up to Blue 5, and Red's
might range from Red 1 through Red 3. This would be a five -by-three
game and we would write it as "5 X 3 game".
The rules for the play of the game would be specified and they
would contain information from which we can determine what happens
at the end of any play of the game: What is the payoff when, say,
Blue uses strategy Blue 3 and Red uses Red 2. There will be
5 X 3 = 15 of these pairs and hence that number of possible values
for the payoff; and these must be known. Whatever the values are, it












Such an array of boxes, each containing a payoff number is called
a game matrix. We shall adopt the convention that a positive number
in the matrix represents a gain for Blue and hence a loss for Red, and
vice versa.
When the original problem has been brought to this form, a Game
Theory analysis may begin, for all the relevant information is rep-
resented in the description of the strategies whose signatures border
the matrix and in the payoff boxes. This is the Game Theory model of
the conflict, and the applicability of the subsequent analysis will depend
completely on the adequacy of this form or representation -- a set of
strategies and a payoff matrix.
IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS
Perhaps the last statement should be expanded. Two complicated
objects are involved: One is the real conflict situation in which Blue
15

and Red are involved. This includes the rules, regulations, taboos,
or whatnots that are really operative; it includes the true motive of
the players, the geography, and in fact everything that is significant
to the actual game. The second object is also real, but much more
simple: It is the rules of the model that have been written, the strat-
egies that have been enumerated and described on paper, and the game
matrix that has been written. There is a relationship -- a significant
one, we trust -- between these two objects. The second object -- the
marks on the paper - is an abstraction from the first. Some non-
obvious properties of this second object can be discovered by making
a Game Theory analysis, and these properties may have some validity
in connection with the first object -- the real world. It will depend on
the adequacy of the abstraction. (Will apply only in accordance with
how much the model applies).
THE CRITERION
What is the criterion in terms of which the outcome of the game
is to be judged. Generally speaking, criterion - trouble is the problem
of what to measure and how to base behavior on the measurements.
Game Theory has nothing to say on the first topic, but it advocates a
very explicit and definite behavior-pattern based on the measurements.
It takes the position that there is a definite way that rational
people should behave, if they believe in the game matrix. The notion
that there is some way people ought to behave does not refer to an
16

obligation based on law or ethics. Rather it refers to a kind of math-
ematical morality, or at least frugality, which claims that the sensible
object of the player is to gain as much from the game as he can, safely,
in the face of a skillful opponent who is pursuing an antithetical goal.
This is our model of rational behavior. Apply the consequences of
this model to a zero- sum game in which all the payoffs are positive;
this means that the strategy options available to the players only affect
how many valuables Red must give to Blue at the end of the game. This
then is an unfair game for Red.
Now the viewpoint in Game Theory is that Blue wishes to act in
such a manner that the least number he can win is as great as pos-
sible, irrespective, of what Red does; this takes care of the safety
requirement. Red's comparable desire is to make the greatest number
of valuables that he must relinquish as small as possible, irrespective
of Blue's action. This philosophy, if held by the players is sufficient
to specify their choices of strategy. If Blue departs from it, he does
so at the risk of getting less than he might have received; and if Red
departs from it, he may have to pay more than he would have otherwise.
The above argument is the central one in Game Theory. There is
a way to play every two-person game that will satisfy this criterion.
However, this is not the only possible criterion; for example, by
attributing to the enemy various degrees of ignorance or stupidity,
one could devise many others. Since Game Theory does not attribute
these attractive qualities to the enemy, it is a conservative theory.
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Note the apparent disparity in the aims of Blue and Red as stated
above; Blue's aims are expressed in terms of winning and Red's in
terms of losing. This difference is not a real one, as both have
precisely the same philosophy. Rather, it is a consequence regarding
the meaning of positive and negative numbers in the game matrix. The
adoption of a uniform convention, to the effect that Blue is always the
maximizing player and Red the minimizing player, will reduce tech-
nical confusion (once it becomes fixed in your mind); but let's not pay
for this mnemonic by coming to believe that there is an essential lack
of symmetry in the game treatment of Blue and Red. There is not
actually any lack of symmetry [15].
SOLUTION
Finally, the solution of a game is an optimal strategy for each
player and a real number which represents the value of the game.
FORMULATION OF THE GAME
In the formulation which follows the terminology developed above
will be used freely. Additional concepts, definitions and notations
will be introduced and defined as it is needed.
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III. BASIC ALLOCATION MODELS
Rapid, secure, and reliable communication is indispensable in
marshalling resources to obtain the military and political objective.
Quality and quantity of communication systems often provide the margin
of victory. It, then, is a recognized fact in the military that effective
communication is an essential element for success of a command.
The military spends vast sums of money annually in an effort to
procure the equipment, personnel, and other resources needed by a
commander to establish effective communications. Without effective
communications it would be difficult for a military unit to survive in
today's combat environment.
One of the main objectives, then, of the commands engaged in a
battle is to establish as effective a communication system as possible.
Obviously, they will, in general, attempt to attain this goal through
the proper use of communication resources. On the contrary, the
enemy will attempt to distribute their anti- communication resources in
such a way as to maximize their gain (i. e. minimize the effectiveness
of the communication system or maximize their anti- communication
efforts).
A conflict situation has now been described in which the participants
are able to influence the outcome by selecting various allocations of
communication (anti-communication)resourceg. Each of the competing
commands must make a decision as to how much resources to allocate,
19

their objectives being conflicting. The conditions necessary to examine
the problem of optimal allocation of resources by using Game Theory
have now been established.
In the presentation of MODELs to follow bear in mind that the
prime objective of this paper is to briefly review representative
examples of work previously done in the attack-defense area and show
how it can be applied to the optimal allocation problem for communica-
tion resources. The general procedure to be followed will be to form-
ulate the allocation of communication resources as a Game Theory
problem and then to mention/discuss the following properties of the
model; anti- communicator (defense) analysis, questions answered,
description (of model), strategies, payoff, solution. Mathematical
proofs of theorems and mathematical manipulations to derive solutions
will be referenced (from the attack-defense literature) but will not be
repeated here. It is considered more advantageous for the purposes
of this paper to merely state theorems which already have been proved




Suppose the communication system of command A must deliver
messages from a rear area to an advanced area by one of N independent
methods (routes) subject to interruption by enemy action (i. e. action
20

of Command B). (By "independent routes" is meant routes such that a
single enemy action cannot interrupt more than one. ) If the route must
be selected in ignorance of the interruption plans of the enemy and the
enemy must use his anti- communication resources without knowing
the route over which the messages will be transmitted, the situation
described may be regarded as a Blotto game in which A selects the
route (battlefield) for the transmission of messages (A's forces)
while B distributes his resources (B's forces) to interrupt trans-
missions over the different possible routes (battlefields). It is
assumed that each route will be controlled by the command allocating
the most resources to that route. Both A and B have a fixed amount
of resources, X and Y respectively, that must be allocated among the
possible routes. It is also assumed that the value of the message
traffic, t:, over each route will go completely to the command using
the most resources on that route.
Let N = total number of routes
Each route, i, represents an amount of traffic t-, where i= 1,2,3, . . . N
N
y t: = T, where T represents the total message traffic value
i=l
X^ = Amount of communication resources allocated
by Command A to route i
N
Zx. = X, x. ^
1 i
i = 1
y. = Amount of anti-communication resources allocated





The structure of the stated problem allows for construction of
the following pay off table.
Relation of resource allocation A's payoff B's payoff
x, > y. h
xi < Yi h
x i = Yi 1/2 t. 1/2 ^
TABLE I
Since both Command A and Command B are trying to secure as
large a portion of the message traffic value as possible, the difference
between the two commands message traffic value has been chosen as
the objective function. Further, Command A is assumed to be the
maximizing player and Command B is assumed to be the minimizing
player. Therefore, if we define D to be the difference between A's
and B's message traffic value then we have
N
d - 2 t, where t.
i = 1
is positive for x- y.
is negative for x- y-







y x. = x , x. = o
1=1
N
2 yi = Y , y. ?
i= 1
A will select a strategy to maximize D, and B will select a strategy
to minimize D.
The problem has now been formulated as a zero-sum, two-person
game. The formulation of this game is similar to the well known
Colonel Blotto Game and may be summarized as follows:
Two players (A and B) contending on N independent battlefields
(labeled 1, 2, ... N) must distribute their forces (X and Y units,
respectively) to the battlefields before knowing the opposing deployment.
The payoff (a numerical measure of the gain of A or equivalently of the
loss of B) on the ith battlefield is given by a function P^ (x, y) depend-
ing only on the battlefield and the opposing forces x and y committed
to that battlefield by A and B. The payoff of the game as a whole is
the sum of the payoffs on the individual battlefields.
In order to thoroughly examine the game we have developed, it is
necessary to inspect two cases. In the first case both Command A and
Command B have an equivalent amount of resources. In the second
case one of the two commands has a larger amount of resources than
his adversary. In summary:
23

Case I: Both commands have an equivalent amount of
resources
X = Y
Case II: Command A has a larger amount of resources
X >Y
2. Case I : X = Y .
This case, where x = y, has the property of symmetry. It cor-
responds very closely to the symmetric case of the Colonel Blotto
Game.
It can be shown that the solution to this case lies in a mixed
strategy for each of the two players, and the mixed strategies used
by each player are identical. Note that a new term, mixed strategy,
has been introduced. It has already been explained that in a game
situation the players have a number of alternative actions available to
them. In some cases a player would find that a pure strategy was his
optimal strategy, which means he would follow the same course of
action at each play of the game. On the other hand if a player's
optimal strategy is a mixed strategy, then he chooses different courses
of action at each play of the game. The player's choice of action would
be determined by a probability distribution over all his possible courses
of action. [6, 9].
The solution for A, which is identical to the solution for B, is as
follows:
Command A selects an allocation for the i route with equal




3. Case II : x > y.
This case, where x > y, unlike Case I, is non- symmetric.
It also corresponds to a case of the Colonel Blotto Game, the non-
symmetric case.
a. Solution for Command A: Allocate an amount x^ to




interval ( 0, —^— ). This is identical to the strategy employed by
both Command A and Command B in Case I.
b. Solution for Command B: Since B has less resources to
allocate than A, B cannot allocate resources to each potential route, i.
If he did, then A with the greater amount of resources available to
allocate would be able to match B's effort and, in addition allocate an
additional amount £ to each potential route. A would obtain the total
message traffic value, T. Obviously, this would not be in B's best
interest. B wants to minimize A's payoff (or maximize his own (B's)
payoff). In this situation B would use a mixed strategy, which would be




probability that B does not allocate resources to a given route is then
( 1 - X ). To those routes to which B does decide to allocate re-
x
sources, B allocates an amount y^ at random on the interval
2 f x
( 0, I ). (Note: B varies his strategy as to which routes he will
T
allocate resources to, but to those routes to which he allocates resources,
he uses the same allocating strategy as A. )
The value of the game in both Case I and Case II is;
D = T ( 1 - -X— ), where in the symmetric case, D = 0. [10]
x
4. Further Study.
Friedman [9] discusses advertising expenditures using similar
models. Peisakoff [13] examined the general case of the Colonel Blotto
Game using similar model. Interested readers desiring to further study
this type model would profit by reviewing these references.
B. MODEL II
1. Problem
The problem is the same as for Model I. Changes in assump-
tions and the like will be mentioned explicitly.
2. Anti- Communicator (Command B - Red) Analysis
The problem is a distribution of anti- communication resources
among message traffic routes of differing value.
3. Questions to be Answered




If anti- communication resources are only allocated to
some routes, which ones?
Should a/c allocations be in proportion to message traffic
route value?
Should common resources be allocated to all routes?
If communication resources are only allocated to some
routes, which ones?
Should communication resources be allocated in proportion
to message traffic route value?
4. Model
Anti- Communicator, Red, had D units of resource. There
are n number of message traffic routes numbered r^, r2, . . . r .
Message traffic route values are v,, v
? , ...
v where
< v l» " v2 " ' ' • * vn
Communicator, Blue, has A unit3 of communication resources.
A = D (Covers both Case I and Case II of Model I)
Strategies
(1) A strategy for the Communicator is the allocation of his




x lt x _,..., x } x. = and -, x. = A12 n J i i=li
Each x- represents the amount of communication resources
allocated to message traffic route r..
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(2) A strategy for the anti- Communicator, Red, is a set of
numbers Yv Yz * • • • » Yn } Yj = . | yi = D
Each y. represents the amount of anti- communication
resources allocated to message traffic route r..
5. Payoff
Assume that; (1) (1 unit of communication resource) =
(1 unit anti- communication resource)
(2) Availability of message traffic route is
proportional to the number of communication
resources in excess of anti- communication
resources for each route.
N
M (x, y) = X v. max (0, Xj - y. )
i = 1
6. Properties of Solution
Communicator (Blue)
(1) Never assign resources to low valued routes
(2) Use a mixed strategy for high-valued routes (use
entire amount of resources on one route selected at random).
Anti- Communicator (Red)
(1) Do not assign anti -communication resources to low
valued message traffic routes







(a) value of routes, (b) allocation of anti-
communication resources, and (c) probability of allocation of commu-
nication resources are not necessarily the same.
7. Model Reduces to
n
max min
^J v. max (0, x^ - y-)
X.
n •






Dresher [6 &t 7] discusses the attack-defense game with many
targets of different values giving proofs and detailed development of
solutions for model that is mathematically similar to Model II above.
C. MODEL III
1. Problem
The problem is basically the same as for Model I and Model II.
However, in this model each player is assumed to have several dif-
ferent types of resources to be divided in an optimal fashion among
a fixed set of message traffic routes. The payoff function of the game
29

is convex. The "no soft-spot" of Dresner, and the concept of the
generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal
strategies for each player and the value of the game.
Specifically, the communicator and the anti -communicator
each have a fixed amount of resources that are to be allocated among
a set of targets. The resources are divided into a fixed number of
types. The communicator (Blue) has A resource units divided into
S types and the m— type consisting of a units with;m
y a = Amm = 1
2. Model
Anti- Communicator, Red, has D units divided into r types;
nV dj =D
There are n routes labeled R, , R_, . . . , R
i c n
The route value is I . > where , & - 2L - ... - # .
i ' c n
Communicator, Blue, has A units divided into S types;
s
5" a = A
>c
-', mm = 1
A^D
Strategies




xim ' i = l ' 2 ' * * * ' n





:. - «t ana ^7 aim m 2, . m1=1 m = 1
5* x. = a d = A
(2) Anti- Communicator - A strategy for the anti- communicator
is a set of numbers;
yi : , i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n









(3) x^m and y^: denote, respectively, the communication
resources of type m and the anti-communication resources of type j
assigned by each command (player) to the i— route. Clearly, each
payoff function is convex in y for each x and convex in x for each y.
3. Payoff
The rruil type of resource unit, if unopposed, can earn for the
communicator a unit payoff e , independent of the message traffic
route. Further, each route R. ( 1 = i = n) has a unit value % = 0.
1 x
That is each unopposed communication resource unit of type m at the
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iHl route will earn for Blue a payoff #. £ . Finally, the attacker is
1 m






Introducing distinct types of communication and anti- commu-
nication resource units requires the anti- communicator to determine
what percentage of his resources at each route will be expended on
each type of communication resource unit. To simplify the present
analysis, we will assume that this decision process is defined by a
matrix-/j-= ( Am i )> where X. m i denotes that fraction of the allocated
anti -communication resource units of type j to be used against a
communication resource unit of type m at any route. This definition
implies that
OtX . i 1 ( l*j*r, l*m*s),
s
= 1 ^mj - 1.m i ' v m
The types of resource units available to the players will
partially determine the assignment of values to the \ in i ' s. For
example, anti-radio communication resources cannot be used to
interrupt wire communications. Since the anti- communicator 's
optimal strategy and the game value depend strongly on the elements




For the sake of definiteness, we will assume henceforth that
s = r. Then the column vectors of /la re linearly independent. If
they were not, then two or more types of anti- communication units
could be combined into a single type without loss of generality.
Therefore, the rank of /i equals s. If s > r, we must work with
the transpose of /V . In this case, the row vectors of
_/\. are
linearly independent and the rank of /i. equals r .
4. Payoff Function
Case I - interested only in transmitting messages
over message route. Want superiority for
each message route (communication resource)
type.
M(x,yj = n£ v S£ max [o, Em(xim £ X Y . ) |1=1 m = 1 L J J
Case II - concerned with preventing the anti- communicator
from achieving an offensive role. Want overall
superiority on each message traffic route.
n
r
s r 1M(x,y)= 2T tf • max b, 2 E (xim - £ . y .)
itlf x L m=l m j = l mj ijj
5. Assumptions
(1) Game consists of a single move during which the players
act simultaneously.
(2) Routes are independent of one another.
(3) Resources of equal amounts neutralize each other.
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(4) Commitment of resources by a player, once made,
can't be changed.
6. Properties of the Solution
(1) The communicator (Blue) has an optimal mixed strategy
which consists of allocating his entire resources to a single message
traffic route chosen by means of a probability-distribution function.
(2) The anti- communicator (Red) has the optimal pure strategy
(the y that minimizes max M(x, y)) of allocating each type of anti-
x
communication resource over the n routes.
(3) The value of the game is the min max M(x,y).
y x
(4) Cohen [2] theorem of section 3 completely characterizes
the solution of the game. However, it does not provide any practical
means for determining either the optimal strategies or the value of
the game. We achieve this by using Dresher's "No Soft-Spot
Principle" [3, 4], which states that an optimal strategy for Red is to
allocate only to those routes which, under a concentrated allocation
by Blue, would yield to Blue the value of the game. Conversely, Blue
should allocate only to those routes which Red chooses to allocate
resources to.
7. Model Reduces to
Case I - Interested only in transmitting messages




2 *i fe max P> c (v z: > y..)l
= 1 m=l L m j = l mj K J
max mm
x y i l = 1
subj to 2T am = A, xim ? , ytj =
m = 1-
r
j?i d j = D
m = 1 ' mj ' rnj
, (1 £j = r, 1 = m^S)




t I, max [0, J^ Em ,x.m . 2 *mj y..,]
sub to






m = 1 ' mJ mJ
, (1 = j = r, 1 = m, £s)
8. Further Study
Cohen [2] generalizes results of Karlin and Dresher for an
attack-defense model similar to Model III. Detailed proofs and
developments of solution are given therein.
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IV. USE OF MODELS
Like any model, including the most complex simulation or war
game, these models are only an abstraction of the real world. Thus,
what is important is not the specific numerical results, but rather the
insight obtained by the model into a qualitative description of the
structure of the logistics allocation decision. This can provide the
basis for more detailed analysis of resource allocation and help mold
the intuitive assessment of the real world problem [12].
A. SPECIFIC USE
The use of the specific models illustrated in this paper is rather
limited. One can easily be misled if what is learned from one model
or three models is just summarized and then that information is used
for all situations. One must know that other models exist and that
"danger" also exists if you apply a model to the wrong problem. How
much a model (an abstraction of the real world conflict) applies will
depend upon the adequacy of the particular model in describing the
real world conflict.
B. GENERAL USE
In general, it is apparent that practically all Game Theory Models;
attack-defense, res apply, logistics allocation, and the like can be
used in Game Theory Analysis of the problem of allocation of
36

communication resources. This was the important "discovery" of
author early in his research. This is also the main point the author
desires to highlight for the reader (i. e. practically all Game Theory
Analysis /models can be used in various military applications if the
problem can be formulated. ). The crucial point is to formulate the
problem correctly, and in the solution to bear in mind what the
assumptions, capabilities, and limitations are of the mathematical
model that you are using to analyze the real world conflict.
C. EXTENSION OF MODELS
This paper discusses three models. There are many, many
different models that will fit almost any situation [6 & 7]. One group
of games worth mentioning and describing are the continuous games.
In a finite or discrete game previously considered each player
selected a strategy from a finite set of strategies. The number of
such strategies may be larger, as in chess, but finite. A natural
generalization is to consider games in which each player has avail-
able an infinite number of strategies over a closed interval. In
particular, we shall assume that each player has a continuum of
strategies from which to select a strategy to play the game.
Such a game is called a continuous game. There is no loss of
generality if we assume that the strategies are represented by points
on the closed interval [0, 1]. For if S is the set of strategies, then
by relabeling the elements of S, we can get a game in which the
selection of a strategy is made from the closed interval [0, 1].
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There are two reasons for developing a theory of continuous
games. First, many military and economic problems actually involve
an infinite number of strategies. For example, a military budget can
be thought of as being divisible in an infinite number of ways between
offense and defense. A commodity can have an infinite number of
price possibilities. Secondly, computations using a continuous variable
are generally easier than those using a large number of discrete





The extensive work that has been done in the attack-defense area
can be applied profitably to the problem of allocation of communication
resources. For treatment of attack-defense game see Blackett [l],
Cohen [2], Cooper and Restrepo [3], Moglewer and Payne [12], and
Peisakoff [13].
One should be aware of the many models that exist and more
importantly, aware of when they can profitably be applied to a partic-





As previously mentioned there are some important things to be
done in Game Theory. One is to develop further the theory itself,
so that more difficult and varied problems can be solved. Another is
to find situations to which existing theory can be profitably applied.
Applying Game Theory to the allocation of resources is not new.
This became apparent to the author early in his research. However,
applying Game Theory specifically to the allocation of communication
resources as discussed in this paper was new to the author. Many
other areas to which Game Theory can be profitably applied are
omnipresent and worthy of future study. ( i. e. A concept now aware
to me is that Game Theory can profitably be applied to any conflicting
situation).
S. Moglewer and C. Payne [12] developed a model which is felt
to be significant in formulating a new point of view for military
logistics decisions. This paper is of very recent vintage. It is felt
that many, many military areas and situations are available for new
analysis by Game Theory. Significant contributions could be made in
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